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This paper characterizes the optimal reciprocal trade policy in the environment of 
Melitz (2003) with firm productivity heterogeneity. In particular, without making parametric 
assumptions on firm productivity distribution, this paper derives the optimal degree of 
reciprocal tariff reductions that maximize the world welfare. A reciprocal import 
subsidy raises the industry productivity, lowering aggregate price; a reciprocal import 
tariff helps correct the markup distortion, increasing nominal income. With all the 
conflicting effects of import tariffs on welfare considered, the optimal degree of 
reciprocity in multilateral tariff reduction is shown to be free trade. 
Keywords: Firm Heterogeneity, Reciprocal Trade Policy, Import Tariff, Markup Distortion, 
Aggregate Productivity 
 





This article contributes to the literature of optimal trade policy in the environment 
of Melitz (2003) with firm productivity heterogeneity. In particular, without making 
parametric assumptions on firm productivity distribution, this paper derives the 
optimal degree of reciprocal tariff reductions that maximize the world welfare. A 
reciprocal import subsidy raises the industry productivity by shifting market shares 
toward the more productive exporting firms and trimming the least productive firms. 
On the other hand, a reciprocal import tariff (by a wedge equal to the monopolistic 
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markup) equalizes the opportunity cost of consuming foreign and local varieties, 
correcting the markup distortion identified by Gros (1987). The two countervailing 
considerations offset each other at the world aggregate level. Thus, the old doctrine of 
reciprocal free trade championed in the classical paradigm of perfect competition with 
homogeneous goods continues to hold up in a world with monopolistic competition 
and heterogeneous firms. 
The optimal trade policy under firm heterogeneity has been analysed by Demidova 
and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) in a small-country setting and Felbermayr, Jung and 
Larch (2013) in a large-country setting, under the Pareto assumption for the firm 
productivity distribution. Their focus is, however, on the unilateral optimal degree of 
trade interventions. The unilateral optimal tariff was shown to be positive, and can be 
decomposed into wedges corresponding to the markup distortion, entry distortion, and 
terms-of-trade externality (with the third component present only in the large-country 
case). Analysis of unilateral optimal policy for small-open economies was further 
extended by Haaland and Venables (2016) to allow for the presence of an additional 
perfectly-competitive sector. 
The studies by Baldwin (2005) and Baldwin and Forslid (2006) analysed the 
impacts of trade liberalization on firm-level dynamics and aggregate welfare. Their 
analysis suggests that countries gain from reciprocal trade freeness. They, however, 
model the policy variable in terms of iceberg trade cost (rather than tariffs). This limits 
the policy option to the non-negative domain, and implies a monotonic relationship 
between trade freeness and aggregate welfare in this domain. As our analysis below 
suggests, the strength of trade cost on firm dynamics is not identical to that of tariffs, 
and trade freeness beyond free trade (with reciprocal positive import subsidy) is 
suboptimal. 
This paper is also related to the work of Bagwell and Lee (2018), who studied the 
unilateral optimal, jointly optimal, and Nash equilibrium trade policy in the Melitz 
setup, but with Pareto productivity distribution and an additional competitive sector. 
They find that starting at global free trade, efficiency is enhanced with small import 
subsidies. This is contrary to the current paper’s conclusion. This suggests that labor 
mobility across sectors (or in general, endogenous changes in the size of labor force 
employed in the Melitz-type sector), a mechanism not present in the current paper, 
may introduce another incentive for trade intervention. I elaborate on this further after 
developing the current paper’s theoretical framework. 
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In Section 2, I start by clarifying the roles played by trade policy, in contrast with 
iceberg trade cost in the setting of Melitz (2003), before characterizing the optimal 
reciprocal trade policy. Import tariffs and iceberg trade cost were often taken to be 
equivalent in the literature following Melitz (2003), and trade liberalization was often 
modeled as a consequence of exogenous reduction in trade cost. This is contrary to the 
focus of trade liberalization in practice where trade policy plays a central role and its 
level is an object of negotiation. 
I show in Section 2.3 that import tariffs have a more severe trade-restricting effect 
than iceberg trade cost, such that the cutoff productivity level for firms to produce is 
lower and the cutoff productivity level for firms to export is higher. As a result, a larger 
mass of local firms (varieties) and a smaller mass of competing foreign firms (varieties) 
can survive with import tariffs than with iceberg trade cost. 
The characterization of welfare also changes qualitatively when trade cost is 
replaced by import tariffs (Section 2.4). In particular, one needs to take into account 
the nominal income change (via tariff revenues) in addition to the aggregate 
productivity (price) change as the tariff rate varies. Tariff revenues increase non-
monotonically as the tariff increases above the free trade level, while the price 
decreases non-monotonically as the tariff decreases below the free trade level. The net 
effect of the two, however, has a unique maximum, and free trade is demonstrated to 
be the optimal reciprocal policy (Section 2.5). This finding of free trade optimality is 
nontrivial, given the presence of imperfect competition and price markup on one hand 
(which tends to encourage the use of import tariffs) and the presence of endogenous 
intra-industry reallocations of market shares across firms of heterogeneous 
productivity on the other hand (which tends to encourage the use of import subsidies). 
Further discussions of the paper’s mechanisms and their parallels to the literature 





In Melitz (2003), it is assumed that there are ( + 1) symmetric countries, each 
with a population size . In each country, a representative consumer has a C.E.S. 
utility function with an exponent  over a continuum of goods. The set of goods 
produced are endogenously determined and are produced using labor alone. Wage is 
taken to be the numeraire. There is an unbounded mass of potential firms, who can 
240 Pao-Li Chang 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
choose to pay a fixed entry investment cost  to draw a productivity parameter  
from a common distribution ( ) and decide whether to produce a good (variety). 
To produce a good, a firm has to pay a fixed overhead cost  and a constant marginal 
cost . To export to each of the other  countries, a firm has to pay in addition a fixed 
trade cost , and incur a variable iceberg trade cost; that is,  units of a good must 
be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at destination. If firms decide to produce, 
there is a probability  per period that they will be hit by bad shocks and exit the 
market. Given the above cost structure that applies every period, firms calculate the 
expected profits of entry based on the productivity distribution ( ) and enter the 
market if the expected profits from all future periods cover the entry cost . 
Equilibrium is characterized by the cutoff productivity level ∗ for production, the 
cutoff productivity level ∗  for firms to export, the mass  of local varieties 
produced, and the mass  of local varieties exported (or equivalently, the mass of 
imported varieties from each of the trading partners). 
 
2. Tariffs versus Trade Cost 
 
Let the setup be the same as in Melitz (2003), but let the variable trade cost be 
replaced by import tariffs. Let  denote one plus the ad valorem tariff rate. Given the 
C.E.S. preference, a firm with a productivity level  will charge a producer price = , which is also the consumer price at home, but will charge a higher consumer 
price abroad =  to reflect the import tariff. The firm sells a quantity =( / )  and receives a revenue = = ( / )  in its home market, 
where =  is the elasticity of substitution across goods that enter the utility 
function and equivalently the aggregate quantity index ,  is the associated 
aggregate price of the goods, and ≡  is the corresponding aggregate 
expenditure. The firm, if it exports, sells a quantity = ( / )  and receives a 
revenue = =  from each of the  overseas markets. Let ≡ −( + / ) and ≡ − ( + / ) denote the corresponding profits made 
from catering to the domestic market and from each of the  overseas markets by the 
firm. 
Comparing the above expressions with those in Melitz (2003), we could see that 
import tariffs differ from iceberg trade cost in two fundamental ways. First, recall that 
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in the case of iceberg trade cost, an exporter receives an export revenue  from 
each of the  overseas markets, which is higher compared with the export revenue 
 in the current case of import tariffs. To see why, note that the export revenue in 
the case of iceberg trade cost can be read in two ways: =  (that is, for the 
consumer in the importing country, the consumer price of the imported good is 
effectively =  for each unit of the good actually received) or =  
(that is, for the exporter, the producer price is , but more units, , are produced 
than actually consumed, ). The exporting firm effectively sells the extra units of the 
good ( − 1)  that melt away in transit to the consumer at the producer price  
and receives a revenue ( − 1)  for producing them. Thus, at the end of the day, 
the exporter does not bear the iceberg trade cost (although its sales volume  is 
indirectly affected by the higher consumer price ); the importing country does. In 
the case of import tariffs, the exporting firm pays the tariff revenue ( − 1)  out 
of its gross sales  and receives a net export revenue  from each of the  
overseas markets. Thus, exporters are affected more severely by import tariffs than 
iceberg trade cost by a factor of  in terms of export revenues. As will be shown 
below, this difference leads to changes in the cutoff productivity level for export (as it 
takes a more productive firm in the case of import tariffs to make enough revenues to 
cover the cost of export) and in the cutoff productivity level for production, as well as 
in the mass of local and foreign varieties available. 
Second, although both types of trade restriction leads to a higher overseas consumer 
price  (relative to  in the domestic market for a given variety), in the case of 
import tariffs, the price premium is captured by the importing country as tariff revenues, 
and the country as a whole pays the same producer price  as the home country of 
the producer; in the case of iceberg trade cost, the units of the good that melt away 
during the transit are lost to the importing country. Thus, with import tariffs, the 
welfare calculation changes, as tariff revenues now enter as an extra source of income 
in addition to the wage income. With import tariffs, the focus of welfare calculation 
also changes from a positive question (what is the impact on a country’s welfare as the 
level of trade cost changes following an exogenous technology shock) to a normative 
question (what is the optimal reciprocal tariff rate for countries to levy). With iceberg 
trade cost,  is necessarily greater than one; with trade policy,  could range from 
being less than one (an import subsidy), one (free trade), to greater than one (an import 
tariff). 
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The trade policy studied in this paper corresponds to the multilateral, reciprocal, 
import policy that is agreed upon by countries and imposed simultaneously against 
each other. Although the export policy will not be analyzed, the equivalence of an 
export subsidy (tax) and an import subsidy (tariff) in the current setting is understood. 
In the current setting with symmetric countries, a country’s aggregate export revenue 
earned by its exporting firms is equal to its aggregate value of imports f.o.b. from its 
trading partners. Thus, countries by agreeing to levying a reciprocal import tariff ( −1), which discourages the quantity of imports and collects tariff revenues on the 
reduced import volume, is equivalent to levying a reciprocal export tax of the same 
magnitude, which reduces the quantity of exports and collects tax revenues from these 
reduced exports. Both discourage the volume of trade while generate tax revenues. 
Similarly, a reciprocal import subsidy is equivalent to a reciprocal export subsidy of 
the same magnitude. Thus, in this setting, it is sufficient to focus the policy negotiations 
on just the imports or the exports. With this equivalence noted, the following 
discussions continue with the reference to the import tariff. 
 
3. Characterization of Firm-level Equilibrium 
 
Following the characterization in Melitz (2003), let ( ) =
( ) ( ) ,  ( ) = [ ( )/ ] − 1,  and ( ) = [1 − ( )] ( ) , 
where ( ) is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to ( ), ( ) 
represents the weighted average of firm productivities above a cutoff level , ( ) 
the average firm profit derived from the domestic (overseas) market as a ratio of fixed 
overhead (export) cost, and ( ) the corresponding unconditional expected profit. 
Note that ( ) = − ( − 1)[1 − ( )][ ( ) + 1] < 0 , as shown in Melitz 
(2003). Firms with the productivity level ∗  and ∗  make just enough variable 
profits from the domestic market and overseas markets to cover the fixed overhead 
production cost and the fixed export cost, respectively: ( ∗) = ( ∗)/ −  =0, = ( ∗)/ − = 0. These define their relationship:  
 ∗ = ( / ) ∗.                      (1) 
 
It is assumed that >  so that not all firms export. This is a weaker condition 
on the magnitude of trade restriction than in Melitz (2003) by a factor of  for > 1; 
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the reason for such a difference is the same as mentioned above that exporting is made 
more difficult with import tariffs than with iceberg trade cost. Free entry ensures that 
the expected profit of entry equals the entry cost, which leads to another condition on 
the cutoff productivity levels:  
 ( ∗) + ( ∗) = , (2) 
 
which is the same as in Melitz (2003). Thus, (1) and (2) determine the cutoff 
productivity levels ∗ and ∗. It is worth noting that the equilibrium lower cutoff 
productivity level ∗ will be lower and the export cutoff productivity level ∗ will 
be higher with import tariffs than with iceberg trade cost of the same magnitude, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. This is because (2) is the same in both cases depicting a negative 
relationship between the two cutoff productivity levels to maintain a constant expected 
profit of entry. On the other hand, (1) drawing a positive relationship between the two 
cutoff productivity levels (derived based on relative market shares) has a higher 
positive slope with import tariffs than with iceberg trade cost. Thus, import tariffs harm 
exporters and protect local producers more than iceberg trade cost. The average firm 
profit for successful entrants = /[1 − ( ∗)] is therefore lower with import 
tariffs than with iceberg trade cost. 
 
Figure 1. Relative magnitude of lower cutoff ∗ and export cutoff ∗ productivity levels 
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It is straightforward to verify that an increase in the import tariff has qualitatively 
similar effects as an increase in the iceberg trade cost on all the firm level variables 
such as ∗ , ∗ , domestic sales ( ) for > ∗ , and combined domestic and 
overseas sales ( ) + ( ) for > ∗ . For example, an increase in import 
tariffs will lower the survival cutoff productivity level but raises the bar for firms to 
export:  
 ∗ = − ∗ ( ∗ ) ∗( ∗) ∗ ( ∗ ) ∗ < 0, (3) 
 ∗ = − ( ∗)( ∗ ) ∗ > 0.  (4) 
 
It also increases a firm’s domestic sales, lowers an exporter’s overseas sales, and 
overall decreases an exporter’s combined domestic and overseas sales: 
( ) > 0, 
and 
[ ( ) ( )] < 0. 
 
4. Characterization of Aggregate Equilibrium and Welfare 
 
I now characterize the aggregate equilibrium. Let  denote the aggregate firm 
revenue and  the aggregate tariff revenue. In equilibrium, a country’s aggregate 
expenditure = +  equals its aggregate income +  (the aggregate firm 
profit Π does not enter the aggregate income calculation separately, as with free entry, 
it is equal to the aggregate labor  used for entry investment that is part of ). This 
implies that = . The same condition appeared in Melitz (2003). However, bear in 
mind that in the case of import tariffs, the average firm profit is lower and the 
probability of export conditional on successful entry ≡ [1 − ( ∗)]/[1 −( ∗)] is lower; thus, the average firm revenue ≡ ( + + ) is lower as 
well. As a result, a larger mass of local firms (goods) = / = /  can be 
supported with import tariffs compared with iceberg trade cost. On the other hand, the 
mass of foreign varieties imported from each trading partner ≡ = // =// / = //[ ( ∗ )] /  is smaller with import tariffs than with 
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iceberg trade cost, as both the unconditional probability of export 1 − ( ∗) and the 
conditional probability of export  are lower. 
The welfare per capita  
 = = ( )/ = (1 + / )  (5) 
 
reflects the real wage component  shown in Melitz (2003) and a new component 
representing the extra source of income from the transfer of tariff revenues ( / )  in real terms. Let us introduce some notations to characterize these 
welfare components. First, note that the portion of export sales in the aggregate firm 
revenue differ from Melitz (2003) by a factor of :  
 
 = +  
     ≡ ∗ ( ∗) + ∗ ( ∗) 
     = ∗ ( ∗) + ∗ ∗∗ ( ∗)  
     = ∗ ( ∗) + ∗ ( ∗) , 
 
where ≡ ( ∗) and ≡ ( ∗). Let ≡ + = (1 + )  denote 
the total mass of varieties available in each country. Define ≡ [ +( / ) ]/ , where  can be regarded as the weighted average 
productivity of all firms with their relative output shares as the weights (exporters with 
a productivity level  behave in overseas markets just like a local firm with a 
productivity level /  in terms of pricing and output shares) and with the productivity 
of all exporters further down-weighted by a factor  reflecting the part of overseas 
sales paid to the importing country as tariffs and not captured as export revenues. It 
follows that  
 = ( ) = .  (6) 
 
Similarly note that,  
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+ = + + ( − 1)  = ( ),   (7) 
 
with ≡ [ + ( / ) ]/ , where  is the average productivity 
of all firms weighted by their relative output shares. In the case of iceberg trade cost, 
there is not such a distinction between (6) and (7); instead, it holds that =( ) =  as seen in Melitz (2003). Next, one can verify that  
 = ( ),                         (8) 
 
whose expressions are the same as in Melitz (2003), as trade cost and tariffs have the 
same effect on pricing behaviors of firms. Using (6), (7), and (8), we can show that  
 1 + / = , (9) 
 = ∗, (10) 
 = ∗. (11) 
 
5. Optimal Reciprocal Trade Policy 
 
I now characterize the comparative statics of the income component and the price 
component of the welfare as the tariff rate changes. Given the definitions of  and 
, note that  
 = 1 + ( / )1 + ( / ) = 1 +1 + , 
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where ≡ = ∗ ( )∗ ( ) , which is (roughly speaking) the market-
share weighted cumulative density of exporting firms relative to that of all active firms. 
Obviously, this decreases in the tariff rate ( / < 0), since fewer firms enter the 
export market and more firms enter the local market with a higher tariff, as shown in 
(3) and (4). It can be shown that  
 = ( ) ( )( )( )   + ( / )( )( )( ) , (12) 
 
which is positive for ≤ 1. Thus, the tariff rate that maximizes a country’s tariff 
revenue (and hence income) is positive. 
This income effect needs to be weighed against the effect of tariffs on the price level 
. It is not immediately clear whether a higher tariff will increase or decrease the 
aggregate price level. A higher tariff increases the consumer price of imports, but at 
the same time decreases the output shares (and hence the importance) of imports in the 
aggregate price index; on the other hand, a higher tariff also admits the survival of less 
productive firms who charge a higher price. It can be shown that the net effect of an 
increase in the import tariff above free trade will drive the overall price level up, which 
imposes a negative effect on welfare. To show this, first note that (3) can be re-
expressed as 
∗ ∗ = − . Using this and (12), it follows that  
 
 = ( / ) ( / ) + ∗ ∗  
 
      = ( ) ( ) ( / )( )( )( ) , (13) 
 
which is negative for ≥ 1. 
Thus, starting from free trade, there is an incentive to impose an import tariff due to 
income consideration, but at the same time, there is an incentive to provide an import 
subsidy due to price consideration. The following derivations show how these two 
considerations work against each other at different levels of import tariff rates:  
 
248 Pao-Li Chang 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
 = ( / ) / +  
     = ( ) ( ) ( / )( )( )( ) , (14) 
 
where the second equality follows by using the results in (12) and (13). Thus,  
 ⋛ 0 ⇔ ⋚ 1, 
 
and the welfare per capita is maximized at the free trade level. By increasing the import 
tariff rate above the free trade level, the negative impact of a higher price level 
outweighs any potential positive impact on income through tariff revenues. Conversely, 
the negative impact of a lower national income by providing an import subsidy would 
outweigh any potential positive impact of a lower price level. The optimal reciprocal 
tariff rate that will maximize every country’s welfare turns out to be zero. 
This result is nontrivial given the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their 
productivities and trade policy may alter the composition of firms and hence the 
industry aggregate productivity. For example, it may be tempting to argue that a 
reciprocal import subsidy is beneficial, as it raises the industry productivity by shifting 
market shares toward the more productive exporting firms and trimming the least 
productive firms. The result above demonstrates that the positive productivity effect, 
reflected in lower prices, of an import subsidy would be dominated by the subsidy cost. 
On the other hand, a frequently heard argument for an import tariff in a 
monopolistically competitive setting is the distortion introduced by the price markup. 
In particular, the price of domestic varieties does not reflect their true opportunity cost 
but are at a markup above their marginal cost of production, whereas the offshore price 
of imported varieties reflects the importing country’s true opportunity cost to obtain 
these goods. An import tariff on foreign varieties equal to the monopolistic markup 
restores the relative market prices of foreign versus domestic varieties to their relative 
opportunity costs, and encourages more consumption of local varieties. The result 
above shows that such potential positive effects on welfare of an import tariff would 
be more than offset by its negative impact on the aggregate productivity. Thus, the old 
doctrine for reciprocal free trade established in the classical paradigm of perfect 
competition with homogeneous goods remains to hold in a world with monopolistic 
competition and heterogeneous firms. 
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6. In Relation to the Literature 
 
To understand the paper’s result further in terms of the literature’s language, I now 
draw the parallel between the paper’s mechanisms to those identified by the literature. 
First, the incentive to impose import tariffs due to income consideration is akin to the 
incentive to correct the markup distortion (the discrepancy between the relative market 
price and the relative opportunity cost of the domestic and foreign varieties) as 
discussed above. On the other hand, the incentive to provide import subsidy so as to 
lower the aggregate price is akin to the incentive to correct the entry distortion 
identified in the literature (where consumers do not take into account that their 
spending on imports increases entry by foreign producers, hence the mass of imported 
varieties). Given that countries are symmetric in the current paper, the terms-of-trade 
incentive for trade intervention is neutralized with reciprocal liberalization. The 
optimality of free trade concluded above suggests that the markup and entry distortions 
offset each other exactly, with balanced market size and with reciprocal free trade. This 
is in contrast with the literature considering unilateral tariff changes, where the entry 
distortion is typically found to be dominated by the markup distortion starting from 
free trade, and as a result, a positive import tariff is welfare-improving. Here, with 
multilateral trade policy coordination, an import subsidy not only increases foreign 
varieties’ presence in the domestic market, it also increases the entry of local varieties 
into foreign markets due to more favorable market access reciprocated by foreign 
countries via an equivalent import subsidy. This amplifies the impact of an import 
subsidy on industry aggregate productivity, and rivals exactly the incentive for an 
import tariff to correct the markup distortion, hence the optimality of free trade. 
Jørgensen and Schröder (2008) also study the optimal reciprocal trade policy in a 
setting with heterogeneous firms. However, they model the firm heterogeneity in terms 
of fixed export cost rather than firm productivities. Firms are identical otherwise. Thus, 
the dynamic effects of trade policy on the industry aggregate productivity as 
emphasized here are absent in their framework. Contrary to the current result, they 
found that the optimal reciprocal import tariff rate is positive. This difference may be 
explained by the fact that the negative impact of a positive import tariff on the 
aggregate productivity (and hence on the welfare level) is not taken into account in 
their framework. 
Contrary to multilateral, reciprocal, trade policies, unilateral trade policies are 
another interesting question. This was studied, for example, by Demidova and 
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Rodríguez-Clare (2009) in a small-economy setting. Because of the small-economy 
setting, asymmetric economic structures across countries are allowed; however, 
parametric assumptions have to be imposed to derive their results. In their framework, 
trade restrictions will not play a symmetric role as here on the importing and the 
exporting country, since the rest of the world’s expenditure, price level, and cost 
structure are taken to be fixed. They found that the optimal unilateral policy for a small 
economy is an import tariff, an export tax, or a consumption subsidy of the same 
magnitude. This lack of incentives to further lower the import tariff unilaterally to the 
free trade level may be explained by the lack of extra export revenues (and extra push 
to the aggregate productivity level) that would be generated if the tariff reduction were 
reciprocal. 
As discussed in the introduction, Bagwell and Lee (2018) find that starting at global 
free trade, efficiency is enhanced with small import subsidies in the Melitz setup, with 
Pareto productivity distribution and an additional competitive sector. This finding, 
contrary to the current paper’s, is likely due to the presence of the competitive sector 
and the possibility of labor reallocation across sectors. In particular, with the additional 
sector that is perfectly competitive, the market price of the differentiated goods relative 
to the competitive good is higher than their relative marginal cost of production, since 
the former sector’s goods are priced at a markup over marginal cost, in contrast with 
the latter sector where price is set at marginal cost. Thus, from the social planner’s 
perspective, the consumption of the differentiated goods, and hence labor allocation to 
the sector, relative to the competitive sector, is less than optimal without further 
intervention (from the benchmark of what is called for to address any global inefficiency 
within the differentiated-good sector, which is shown to be nil in the current paper). 
An import subsidy in this case lowers the aggregate price of the differentiated-good 




As we allow trade restrictions to take on the meaning of trade policy barriers, instead 
of iceberg trade cost, we see that most of the qualitative effects of trade restrictions on 
the firm-level variables hold true as they were proposed by Melitz (2003). This 
similarity probably explains the impressions that trade policy barriers are equivalent to 
iceberg trade cost. However, we also verify from the above analysis that they are not 
equivalent in the strength of their trade-restricting effects and of their welfare 
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implications. With import tariffs, welfare includes an extra real tariff revenue 
component in addition to the real wage component. The variation of welfare with 
respect to tariff rates can be analyzed by studying the variation of the tariff revenue 
and the variation of the aggregate price level as the tariff rate changes. Derivations of 
these comparative statics are complicated by the fact that as the tariff rate varies, the 
cutoff productivity levels for production and for export and the mass of local and 
imported varieties all change at the same time, as was the case in Melitz (2003). They 
are further complicated by the fact that tariff revenues and the aggregate price level are 
nonlinear in tariff rates in different directions. However, as shown, these derivations 
are analytically tractable and have sensible economic interpretations. In the end, the 
conflicting impacts on welfare via these components as the tariff rate varies sum up to 
a clear-cut result that free trade is the best reciprocal policy. 
To conclude, the result of the paper expands the normative support for a free world 
trading system, from the classical setup of perfect competition to the alternative Melitz 
(2003) setup with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity. Some remarks are 
in order. The optimality of free trade is derived in this paper with balanced country 
size and reciprocal trade policy. By allowing for asymmetric country sizes, the 
efficiency of free trade at the global level likely will continue to hold. However, in this 
case, large countries benefit less from a reciprocal import subsidy and entry into 
foreign markets (relative to small countries). The imbalance in welfare concession 
implies that larger countries are likely to favor import tariffs. As a result, reciprocal 
trade liberalization likely will stop short of free trade, provided no international transfer 
mechanism. This might help explain the resistance of developed countries to further 
multilateral liberalization in the recent decades, with increasingly heterogeneous 
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